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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAE ADAMSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Docket No. 890680-DA 
-vs-
RANAE ADAMSON, Priority Classification 14b 
Defendant/Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "the husband" 
or "the father") and hereby submits the following as his reply 
brief in the above-captioned matter: 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The husband's motion to terminate his alimony 
obligation should have been granted based upon the wife's 
cohabitation with another man. 
2. The lower court retained specific jurisdiction to 
reconsider the issue of alimony at a later hearing specifically 
scheduled by the Court at the time of its ruling in the divorce 
matter, and for that reason the court did not need to find a 
substantial change in circumstance in order to terminate the 
husband's alimony obligation* 
3. The motion of the husband to terminate his alimony 
obligation to the wife should have been granted at the review 
hearing pursuant to the equitable powers of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE HUSBAND'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION SHOULD BE 
TERMINATED BASED UPON A FINDING OF 
COHABITATION. 
In Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), the Court 
held that a finding of cohabitation should be based on a common 
residency and sexual contact. The Court in Haddow also held that 
an element of shared living expenses is helpful in determining 
cohabitation. The evidence presented at trial was very clear 
that Mr. Macray had been paying respondent's rent for a period of 
time. The respondent contends that there was no evidence 
supporting the fact that respondent and Mr. Macray were engaged 
in a sexual relationship. Short of invading the privacy of both 
the respondent and Mr. Macray, all surrounding circumstances must 
be examined. The respondent moved into Dean's Great Little 
Lodge, room 30, which had been previously occupied by Mr. Macray. 
Further, it was Mr. Macray who continued to make the monthly 
rental payment on room 30. The evidence also showed that Mr. 
Macray was seen around the motel a great deal of time. Mr. 
Macray also stated that he dated the respondent. The evidence 
also shows that Mr. Macray was never seen carrying in or out of 
the motel room any of his personal belongings. One can 
reasonably conclude that the reason for this was that Mr. Macray 
never moved out or that his personal effects were already located 
in room 30, in which room the respondent resided. Room 30 was a 
standard motel room consisting of only one bedroom. One can 
logically assume that there existed a romantic and/or sexual 
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relationship between respondent and Mr. Macray. 
Based upon the above evidence, the trial court erred in not 
finding cohabitation. Therefore, the lower court should have 
found that there was cohabitation on the part of respondent with 
Mr. Macray and terminated the husband's alimony obligation. 
POINT II: THE LOWER COURT DID NOT NEED TO FIND A 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE IN ORDER 
TO RECONSIDER ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY AT THE 
TIME OF ITS REVIEW. 
Paragraph 11 of the divorce decree, entered on or about 
March 20, 1989 specifically stated that alimony should continue 
"until the death of the plaintiff or defendant, until defendant's 
remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs, or until 
further order of this Court." Within the same paragraph, the 
lower court set a review hearing to reconsider the alimony award. 
If the lower court intended that the alimony cease only upon 
a finding of substantial changes of circumstance, then it would 
not have scheduled a date for review of the alimony, nor would 
the court have included in its order the fact that alimony could 
be terminated upon further order of the court. Because the lower 
court reserved the right to terminate alimony and specifically 
set up a review date, the matter was properly before the lower 
court without a showing of a substantial change in circumstance. 
POINT Ills THE HUSBAND'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION SHOULD BE 
TERMINATED BASED UPON EQUITABLE 
CONSIDERATION AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 
PARTIES. 
The respondent states that equitable considerations support 
an award of alimony. In English v. English, 565 P. 2d 409 (Utah 
3 
1977)f the Court set forth the criteria for determining an award 
of alimony, as follows: "Financial conditions and needs of the 
spouse, ability of the spouse to produce a sufficient income for 
herself and the ability of the husband to provide support." (At 
page 411-412-) 
The respondent is currently receiving public assistance and 
claims to be in need of alimony because of her limited income. 
She states that the reason for her unemployment is health 
problems and that it would be impossible to make the same type of 
wages and still maintain the same standard of living engaged 
while she was married to plaintiff/appellant. The testimony 
presented was that respondent was well enough to work as long as 
she is on her medication and is in a stress-free environment. 
The wife has not made any real effort to seek employment, as 
required by the lower court's specific order that she do so. If 
the respondent is in need of alimony it is because of her own 
inaction and not because of an inability to gain employment. 
The last factor that a court must consider in awarding 
alimony is the ability of the husband to provide support. The 
court must take into consideration not only the income of the 
husband, but also his financial obligations. The husband herein 
has other obligations imposed upon him by the court. He has been 
ordered to pay and assume both the first and second mortgage 
indebtedness of the parties. He is also responsible for the care 
and support of the parties' two minor children and a child from a 
previous marriage. The respondent, although ord«< to pay 
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nominal child support, does not actually contribute to the care 
and support of the parties' two children. It is not possible for 
the husband to meet his monthly expenses and he has had to borrow 
money in order to meet his and the children's most basic needs. 
The money needs to be borrowed because the husband's monthly 
expenses exceed his monthly income by several hundred dollars. 
In contrast, the wife has no debt, pays no real child support and 
is capable of being employed, even if only at minimum wage. In 
addition, the wife receives medical assistance. 
Respondent argues that she gains no benefit from the loan 
that was taken out on the marital residence. However, the 
respondent does indirectly benefit from this. The mortgage 
payments and money borrowed to cover the husband's expenses are 
also for the benefit of the parties' minor children. Their 
support is a legal and moral obligation of the wife. 
While the intent of the court in awarding alimony is to 
equalize the standard of living, in the instant case it is 
unrealistic to presume that either party can now maintain the 
standard of living enjoyed during their marriage. 
While looking at the equitable considerations of whether 
alimony is appropriate or not, the Court must consider the 
ability of the husband to pay. For the above reasons, this Court 
should determine that the lower court erred in not terminating 
alimony due to the husband's inability to pay. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this matter should b* >emanded to 
5 
the trial court for entry of an order requiring that the alimony 
obligation of the husband to respondent terminate, retroactively 
and effective with the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
based upon the wife's cohabitation; or, in the alternative, that 
the alimony terminate effective August 8, 1989, the date of the 
review hearing, based upon the circumstances and equitable 
considerations. 
DATED THIS 8th day of May, 1990. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
C. (ZORBe 
A t t o r n e y £ d j ^ £ l a i n t i f f 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff/appellant 
herein, and that I caused the foregoing Reply Brief to be served 
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APPENDIX A 
HADDOW v. HADDOW 
Cite as 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985) 
Utah 669 
parties the privilege of presenting whatev-
er legitimate contentions they have pertain-
ing to the dispute, appellants are not as a 
matter of law foreclosed from asserting 
defenses based on "fraud" by their failure 
to use the term "fraud" or a derivative 
thereof or by their failure to allege each 
and every element of common-law fraud. 
The overriding inquiry urged in Cheney 
and Williams is whether appellants' factu-
al allegations gave fair notice of the issues 
raised and an opportunity to meet them 
and whether surprise or disadvantage 
would result if the defense or defenses 
were allowed. Both the timing of respon-
dent's motion for summary judgment and 
the specificity of appellants' averments pre-
clude imposing a Rule 12(h) waiver in this 
case. The substance of the acts constitut-
ing the alleged wrong was pleaded with 
particularity in appellants' averment that 
the bank's representatives "promised ap-
pellants that their signatures were for ap-
pearances only and that no collection ac-
tions, legal or otherwise, would be brought 
against Ronald or Margie Swenson based 
on said signatures." This specific allega-
tion, combined with appellants' general 
averment that neither party intended the 
signatures to have effect and that these 
representations induced their signatures, 
gave fair notice that appellants were deny-
ing personal liability on the note because of 
respondent's alleged misrepresentations. 
In Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Mei-
bos, discussed supra, this Court affirmed a 
jury verdict that similar facts constituted 
fraud in the inducement. 
Accordingly, summary judgment is re-
versed, and this case is remanded to the 
district court for further consideration con-
sistent with this opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
Ingrid Mae HADDOW, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
John David HADDOW, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 18368. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 30, 1985. 
Former husband sought order requir-
ing former wife to pay one half of equity of 
home in which she was living pursuant to 
divorce decree which established equitable 
lien if former wife cohabitated with a male 
person. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., imposed 
the lien, and former wife appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that al-
though relatively permanent sexual rela-
tionship existed between former wife and 
male companion, there was no common res-
idency; thus, former wife was not required 
under divorce decree to pay former hus-
band one half of equity in home in which 
she was living. 
Reversed. 
Howe, J., concurred in result. 
Hall, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
1. Divorce 0=»261, 286(8) 
Determination of whether given cir-
cumstances constitute "cohabitation," 
which requires enforcement of equitable 
lien under terms of divorce decree, is in 
reality a mixed question of fact and law, 
and the Supreme Court is not bound by 
conclusion reached by trial court. 
2. Divorce €=184(1) 
In reviewing trial court's actions in 
divorce case, the Supreme Court is vested 
with broad equitable powers. 
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3. Divorce e=>247 
Under statute [U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(3)] 
providing that court order to pay alimony 
to former spouse shall be terminated if it is 
established that farmer spouse is residing 
with person of opposite sex, "common resi-
dency" means sharing of common abode 
that both parties consider their principal 
domicile for more than a temporary or brief 
period of time. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Divorce e=>247 
Under statute [U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(3)] 
providing that court order to pay alimony 
to former spouse shall be terminated if it is 
established that former spouse is residing 
with person of opposite sex, "sexual con-
tact" means participation in a relatively 
permanent sexual relationship akin to that 
generally existing between husband and 
wife. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Divorce <S=>252.5(1) 
Although relatively permanent sexual 
relationship existed between former wife 
and male companion, there was no common 
residency; thus, former wife was not re-
quired under divorce decree, which re-
quired former wife to pay one half of equi-
ty of house in which she was living if she 
cohabited with a male person, to pay for-
mer husband one half of equity in home 
where male companion did not move any 
furniture into home or keep any personal 
items there other than toiletry articles, and 
male companion did not pay any of former 
wife's living expenses or consistently share 
with her any assets. 
6. Divorce <s=»252.5(l) 
In case involving enforcement of eq-
uitable lien on home used by custodial par-
ent, "cohabitation" means to dwell together 
in common residence and to participate in 
sexual contact that evidences a larger con-
jugal relationship. 
David 0. Drake, Costa Mesa, Cal., for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
John D. Parken, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a decision in 
which the trial court found that appellant 
was cohabiting with a man and ordered her 
to pay to her former husband one-half of 
the equity in the home in which she was 
living, pursuant to an equitable lien estab-
lished in the divorce decree. Because we 
believe that the trial court improperly con-
strued the language of the decree, we re-
verse. 
The parties in this action, appellant In-
grid Haddow and respondent John Had-
dow, were divorced on September 11, 1980. 
Mrs. Haddow waived her right to alimony. 
She was awarded custody of the parties' 
three children, who ranged in age from 
seven years to thirteen years. Mr. Had-
dow was ordered to pay child support in 
the amount of $450 per month, and Mrs. 
Haddow was awarded the parties' home, 
subject to an equitable lien in favor of Mr. 
Haddow of half the equity in the home. 
The equity was to be payable upon any of 
the following occurrences: all of the chil-
dren ceased to reside in the house or Mrs. 
Haddow moved out of the house, remar-
ried, or "cohabited with a male person." 
After the divorce, Mr. Haddow entered 
the house and took several items without 
Mrs. Haddow's permission. Thereafter, in 
February 1982, Mrs. Haddow obtained a 
temporary restraining order enjoining Mr. 
Haddow from coming to the house without 
her express permission. A short time la-
ter, Mr. Haddow filed a motion for an order 
requiring Mrs. Haddow to pay him one-half 
of the equity in the home because she was 
allegedly cohabiting with a man. 
At trial, the testimony centered on the 
nature and extent of appellant's relation-
ship with her boyfriend, Hy Hudson. 
There was no dispute that Mr. Hudson 
spent most of his free time with appellant. 
The trial court found that Mr. Hudson had 
dinner at appellant's house five or six times 
HADDOW v. HADDOW 
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a week, that on those occasions he usually P.2d 585, 586 n. 
stayed until sometime between 10:30 p.m. 
and midnight, and that he would often re-
turn in the morning to have coffee or 
breakfast with appellant before work. The 
court also found that Mr. Hudson spent the 
night with appellant approximately once a 
week. There was testimony that Mr. Hud-
son left some clothes at appellant's house 
and that she did some of his laundry and 
sometimes took clothes to the dry cleaner 
for him. Mr. Hudson occasionally show-
ered and changed at the house, particularly 
when he worked late and was going out for 
the evening with appellant. Mr. Hudson 
maintained a separate residence, however, 
living at his parents' home. Although Mr. 
Hudson used appellant's mailing address 
for a couple of bank accounts, he testified 
that he also received mail at his ex-wife's 
address, as well as at his parents' home. 
There was no evidence that Mr. Hudson 
and appellant shared any assets or had any 
joint financial accounts, projects, or liabili-
ties. On several occasions, Mr. Hudson 
gave appellant money to reimburse her for 
the food he ate. He also took her car to be 
serviced at the car dealership where he 
worked. Beyond that, Mr. Hudson made 
no financial or tangible contributions to 
appellant or to her household, nor did he 
share living expenses with her in any 
sense. 
[1,2] On appeal, Mrs. Haddow chal-
lenges the trial court's conclusion that she 
was cohabiting with Mr. Hudson. In its 
memorandum decision, the trial court stat-
ed that there was no substantial conflict in 
the testimony as to the facts of the rela-
tionship between appellant and Mr. Hudson 
and that the controversy was whether their 
conduct constituted cohabitation within the 
meaning of the divorce decree. Although 
the trial court labeled its resolution of that 
question a "finding of fact/' the determina-
tion of whether given circumstances consti-
tute cohabitation requires the application of 
the terms of a court order to a given set of 
facts. This process is in reality a mixed 
question of fact and law, and we are not 
bound by the conclusion reached by the 
trial court. See Ohcell v. Clark, Utah, 658 
707P.2d—16 
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1 (1982). Moreover, in 
reviewing a trial court's actions in a di-
vorce case, we are vested with broad eq-
uitable powers. See Read v. Read, Utah, 
594 P.2d 871, 872-73 (1979). 
In reaching its decision, the trial court 
did not specify its definition of "cohab-
itation." As the trial court pointed out, the 
term "cohabitation" does not lend itself to 
a universal definition that is applicable in 
all settings. As a legal concept, cohab-
itation has been the determinative issue in 
cases involving validity of marriage, see, 
e.g., Boyd v. Boyd, 228 Cal.App.2d 374, 39 
Cal.Rptr. 400 (1964); legitimacy of off-
spring, see, e.g., Burke v. Burke, 216 Or. 
691, 340 P.2d 948 (1959); criminal prosecu-
tion of cohabitants, see, e.g., State v. Bar-
loir, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944); and 
statutory and nonstatutory termination of 
alimony payments, see, e.g., Kaplan v. 
Kaplan, 186 Conn. 387, 441 A.2d 629 (1982) 
(statutory); Simms v. Simms, 245 Ga. 680, 
266 S.E.2d 493 (1980) (statutory); In re 
Clark, 111 Ill.App.3d 960, 444 N.E.2d 1369 
(1983) (statutory); Zipparo v. Zipparo, 70 
A.D.2d 616, 416 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1979) (non-
statutory); hi re Marriage of Vascoyiellos, 
58 Or.App. 390, 648 P.2d 1358 (1982) (non-
statutory), as well as the enforcement of 
equitable liens, as in the present case. To 
some extent, the meaning of the term de-
pends upon the context in which it is used. 
Nonetheless, a majority of cases and stat-
utes that attempt to fix a definition of 
"cohabitation" follow the dictionary defini-
tion, which is: "To live together as hus-
band and wife." Black's Laic Dictionary 
236 (5th ed. 1979); Webster's Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary 257 (1984). 
Neither the word "cohabitation" nor any 
variation of it appears in U.C.A., 1953, Title 
30, chapter 3, the statutory provision gov-
erning divorce. However, language we be-
lieve was drafted for the same purpose as 
the cohabitation clause in the divorce de-
cree is found in section 30-3-5(3), which 
calls for the termination of alimony pay-
ments under certain circumstances. That 
section reads: 
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Any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse shall be ter-
minated upon application of that party 
establishing that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite 
sex, unless it is further established by 
the person receiving alimony that the 
relationship . . . is without any sexual 
contact. 
Although this statute pertains exclusively 
to termination of alimony, we find it note-
worthy that the statute predicates termi-
nation of spousal support on a showing 
that the former spouse is "residing" with a 
person of the opposite sex. Once residence 
is established, alimony obligations are ter-
minated unless the recipient can show that 
the relationship is ''without sexual con-
tact." Wacker v. Wacker, Utah, 668 P.2d 
533 (1983). This Court has already said 
that the residency contemplated by the 
statute is more than a temporary stay. 
See Knuteson v. Knuteson, Utah, 619 P.2d 
1387, 1389 (1980) (where it ww held that a 
stay of two months and ten days did not 
establish a "settled abode" (quoting Web-
ster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 
2d ed.)). However, in neither Knuteson 
nor Wacker were we called upon to define 
sexual contact. 
We also note that neither the record nor 
the divorce decree itself indicates whether 
the cohabitation clause was stipulated by 
the parties to the decree or whether it was 
imposed by the divorce court. If the par-
ties inserted the clause, they gave no testi-
mony at trial as to how they intended it to 
be interpreted. If the divorce court judge 
inserted the clause, we are without benefit 
of his opinion in this matter since he did 
not hear this matter below and is now 
retired from the bench. 
[3,4] We therefore decide that there 
are two key elements to be considered in 
determining whether appellant was cohabit-
ing with Mr. Hudson: common residency 
and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal 
association. Consistent with our holding in 
Knuteson, 619 P.2d at 1389, common resi-
dency means the sharing of a common 
abode that both parties consider their prin-
cipal domicile for more than a temporary or 
brief period of time. Sexual contact means 
participation in a relatively permanent sex-
ual relationship akin to that generally ex-
isting between husband and wife. 
[5] We first address the aspect of sexu-
al contact. As noted above, the trial court 
found that Mr. Hudson spent the night 
with appellant an average of once a week. 
The findings do not indicate how long this 
conduct continued, but the record does 
show that at the time of trial, Mr. Hudson 
and appellant had been dating each other 
exclusively for about fourteen months. 
The court also found that appellant and Mr. 
Hudson had taken a vacation together to 
Hawaii, "sleeping in the same bed and hav-
ing sexual relations," and that the couple 
had spent at least one night together in 
Elko, Nevada. So even if we disregard the 
possibility that sexual relations occurred on 
occasions when Mr. Hudson visited appel-
lant's home but did not remain overnight, 
we are satisfied that the findings below on 
this point establish the presence of a rela-
tively permanent sexual relationship. 
In reaching his decision, the trial judge, 
who admittedly was hindered by a lack of 
applicable standards, placed considerable 
emphasis on the sexual aspect of the rela-
tionship between appellant and her boy-
friend and on the effect on appellant's chil-
dren of the exposure "to a bed and board 
arrangement between the custodial parent 
and a member of the opposite sex." Al-
though we agree with the trial judge that 
this case involves a sensitive situation and 
we are similarly distressed by the circum-
stances of this trial where the children 
were called upon to testify as to the nature 
and extent of their mother's sleeping ar-
rangements, we decline to predicate the 
disposition of the family home on such 
factors alone. The effect on the children 
of appellant's relationship with Mr. Hudson 
might be relevant in a custody dispute, 
assuming the requisite showing of substan-
tial and material change in circumstances 
had been made, see Becker v. Becker, Utah, 
694 P.2d 608 (1984), but custody is not at 
issue in this case and sexual contact, even 
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if extensive, does not alone constitute co-
habitation. A fair reading of the language 
of this decree regarding payment of de-
fendant's lien simply does not dictate such 
a result. In this regard, we find per-
suasive the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme 
Court in a similar case dealing with an 
equitable lien triggered by a cohabitation 
clause in a divorce decree: 
We take it from the ordinary meaning 
of the term, and gather from the obvious 
thrust of the dissolution decree, that a 
sexual relation was part of the intended 
definition. Cohabitation, in order to ma-
ture the lien, was to be with a person of 
the opposite sex. On the other hand the 
sexual relationship was only a part of the 
intended definition, not the whole of it. 
Another ingredient was dwelling, the fac-
et of residing or living in the residence. 
In re the Marriage of Gibson, Iowa, 320 
N.W.2d 822, 823-24 (1982). 
We turn now to the second part of our 
test for cohabitation: common residency. 
It is clear from the record that Mr. Hudson 
spent a substantial amount of time at ap-
pellant's home. However, the trial court 
made no finding that Mr. Hudson either 
spent any time at the home when appellant 
was not there or had a key to the house. 
These circumstances seem particularly sig-
nificant on the question of whether Mr. 
Hudson was living with appellant, since a 
resident will come and go as he pleases in 
his own home, while a visitor, however 
regular and frequent, will schedule his vis-
its to coincide with the presence of the 
person he is visiting. The language in 
Burke v. Burke, 216 Or. 691, 340 P.2d 948 
(1959), summarizes this point well. There 
the court noted, "Cohabitation is not a so-
journ, nor a habit of visiting, nor even 
remaining with for a time; the term implies 
continuity." Id. at 950 (quoting In re 
Wray's Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 19 P.2d 1051 
(1933)). Further, there was testimony that 
Mr. Hudson did not move any furniture 
into appellant's home or keep there any 
personal items other than toiletry articles, 
a few items of clothing that appellant laun-
dered or had dry cleaned, and one picture 
album. At trial, great emphasis was 
placed on the fact that Mr. Hudson brought 
the picture album to appellant's home and 
left it there. However, we fail to see any 
determinative significance in the presence 
of any one or all of these portable items in 
appellant's residence. 
Nor do we find critical the fact that Mr. 
Hudson left a van belonging solely to him 
parked at appellant's home for several 
months. Mr. Hudson testified that he had 
no other place to store the van and that he 
used it primarily for occasions when he and 
appellant took his five children and her 
three children on outings together. Since 
Mr. Hudson's children live with their moth-
er in a neighborhood close to appellant's 
home, wo believe it was not unreasonable 
for Mr. Hudson to park his van in appel-
lant's driveway for a period of time. It 
appears that, as Mr. Hudson claimed, the 
van was in storage at appellant's home, not 
kept on the premises for the convenience of 
daily use. On this point, we also note that 
throughout respondent's testimony on his 
two-week surveillance of Mr. Hudson's ac-
tivities, the presence or absence of Mr. 
Hudson's Datsun, and not the van, was the 
criterion used to determine whether Mr. 
Hudson was at appellant's residence. It is 
apparent that even respondent assumed 
Mr. Hudson used the Datsun for his daily 
commuting, whereas the presence of the 
van told nothing of Mr. Hudson's where-
abouts. 
Our renew of out-of-state case law dis-
closes- that in some jurisdictions a third 
element, shared living expenses, is either 
an essential ingredient of cohabitation, In 
the Matter of Marriage of Edwards, 73 
Or.App. 272, 698 P.2d 542 (1985), or evi-
dence of it, In re Marriage of Roofef 122 
Ul.App.3cl 56, 460 N.E.2d 784 (1984). Al-
though we do not consider the sharing of 
the financial obligations surrounding the 
maintenance of a household to be a requi-
site element of cohabitation, we do find it 
significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay 
any of appellant's living expenses or con-
sistently share with her any of his assets. 
For example, Mr. Hudson did not contrib-
ute anything to appellant's mortgage pay-
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ments, the insurance on her house, or her 
utility bills. His occasional payments to 
appellant for purchasing food and dry 
cleaning his clothes were reimbursements 
and evidence an intent to bear his own 
expenses, not an intent to contribute to 
appellant's household. Nor does it appear 
that Mr. Hudson considered his van, which 
he purchased during the time he and appel-
lant were dating, the property of appellant. 
He alone paid for the van and for the 
insurance on it. We also note that appel-
lant and Mr. Hudson rarely used each oth-
er's automobile, except at times when Mr. 
Hudson took appellant's Oldsmobile to per-
form mechanical maintenance on it and left 
his Datsun in its place. 
In view of these circumstances, it is clear 
that neither appellant nor Mr. Hudson con-
sidered appellant's home Mr. Hudson's 
principal residence. It is therefore our 
opinion that the common residency element 
of cohabitation has not been established. 
Once again, the Iowa Supreme Court's lan-
guage in Gibson is pertinent: 
The time petitioner's boyfriend spent 
in the dwelling was extensive, easily suf-
ficient to qualify as residence if time 
alone controlled. But the time was not 
spent as a resident. He maintained a 
separate residence and shared none of 
the expenses of this one. He did not 
even have a key or freedom to enter it 
except when petitioner was present. In 
simple terms he did not live there.1 
Gibson, 320 N.W.2d at 824. 
[6] In reaching our decision today, we 
construe this divorce decree so as to pre-
serve what we believe to be the intent of 
the parties, while avoiding an interpreta-
tion that is guaranteed to heighten the 
tension between them and unnecessarily 
jeopardize the interests of the minor chil-
dren. Thus, we hold that in a case involv-
ing the enforcement of an equitable lien on 
the home used by the custodial parent, 
"cohabitation" means to dwell together in a 
common residence and to participate in sex-
1. In Gibson, the evidence established the stabili-
ty of the boyfriend's separate residence more 
clearly than did the evidence in this case. None-
ual contact that evidences a larger conjugal 
relationship. While we do find sufficient 
evidence of sexual contact between appel-
lant and Mr. Hudson, the facts as found by 
the trial court do not support a finding of 
common residency. 
Reversed. Costs are awarded to appel-
lant. 
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, J J., con-
cur. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the result. 
HALL, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
I do not join the Court in reversing the 
trial court because the judgment is sup-
ported by substantial evidence and is rea-
sonable and proper under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. In accordance 
with the time-honored standard of appellate 
review, the issue presented is best left to 
the determination of the trial court. 
In reaching its conclusion to reverse, the 
majority applies a sterile definition of the 
term "cohabitation" which is not in context 
with the usage of the term in the decree of 
divorce. As was observed by the trial 
court, the term "cohabitation" does not 
lend itself to a universal definition that is 
applicable in all settings. This is particu-
larly evident in the instant case. Plaintiff 
is certainly "cohabiting with a male per-
son" at least on a part-time basis. 
The fallacy in applying such a sterile 
definition of the term "cohabitation" can be 
seen by applying the definition to a situa-
tion where one cohabits with more than one 
male person during the week or, converse-
ly, where the male person is otherwise oc-
cupied and therefore only able to cohabit 
weekly. 
I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
S*\ 
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theless, we are persuaded here that the evidence 
of nonresidence was sufficient to conclude that 
there was no cohabitation. 
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VERNAL CITY, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
rry Dean CRITTON, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 14683. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 25, 1977. 
efendant appealed a de novo convie-
f driving under the influence entered 
Fourth District Court, Uintah Coun-
Robert Bullock, J. The Supreme 
held that on appeal from conviction 
ving under the influence, no appropri-
sue as to validity of statute was avail-
for review, since defendant's claim of 
istitutional application of statute and 
1 of due process arising out of admis-
of evidence as result of breathalyzer 
iid not constitute challenges below to 
itutionality of statute itself. 
Appeal dismissed. 
iinal Law <s=> 260.1 
On appeal from district court convic-
on trial de novo of driving under the 
lence, no appropriate issue as to validity 
tatute was available for review and 
sion was final, since defendant's claim 
inconstitutional application of statute 
denial of due process arising out of 
lission of evidence of result of a breath-
er test did not constitute challenges be-
to constitutionality of the statute itself. 
.A.1953, 41-6-44.2; Const, art. 8, § 9. 
lobert M. McRae, Salt Lake City, for 
endant-appeliant. 
len Anderton, Vernal City Atty., Vernal, 
plaintiff-respondent. 
Provides as unlawful the driving of a motor 
ehicle by one having a blood alcohol content 
f .10% or greater. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals a District Court trial 
de novo conviction of driving under the 
influence, having been previously convicted 
of the offense in Justice Court. He asserts 
Section 41--(>-44.2, U.C.A.1953,1 was uncon-
stitutionally applied and tha t the admission 
in evidence of the result of a breathalyzer 
test without sufficient foundation was a 
denial of due process. 
The Utah Constitution and case law are 
dispositive of this appeal. The pertinent 
constitutional provision is Article VIII, Sec-
tion 9, which reads as follows: 
Appeals shall also lie from the final 
judgment of justices of the peace in civil 
and criminal cases to the District Courts 
on both questions of law and fact, with 
such limitations and restrictions as shall 
be provided by law; and the decision of 
the District Court on such appeals shall 
be final, except in cases involving the 
validity or constitutionality of a statute. 
[Emphasis added.] 
State v. Robinson,2 and the numerous 
cases cited therein, interpret the foregoing 
constitutional provision and hold that where 
one does not contend in the court below 
that the statute under which he was 
charged was invalid, the decision of the 
District Court is final and not reviewable 
on appeal. 
Defendant's claim of unconstitutional ap-
plication of the statute and lack of due 
process are clearly not challenges to the 
validity or constitutionality of the statute 
itself and hence there is no appropriate 
issue here for review. 
Appeal dismissed. 
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Janet M. ENGLISH, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
W. Daniel ENGLISH, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14760. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 2, 1977. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Bryant H. Croft, J., granted a di-
vorce to wife on her complaint and a di-
vorce to husband on his counterclaim and, 
from portions of decree pertaining to alimo-
ny and support, husband appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that : (1) 
an award of $1,000 in alimony and $250 in 
child support per month was fair and equi-
table and should have been directed con-
sidering parties' 20-year marriage, efforts 
of each party in monetary success of mar-
riage, various ventures, and husband's earn-
ings, and (2) decree of divorce ordering 
husband to maintain children as beneficiar-
ies on his life insurance until each child 
attained age of 25 years was subject to be 
modified so as to provide that children 
would remain beneficiaries until each at-
tained 21 years of age. 
Affirmed as modified. 
1. Divorce <s=>252, 286(2) 
Trial court in a divorce action has con-
siderable latitude of discretion in adjusting 
financial and property interests and party 
appealing therefrom has burden of proving 
that there was a misunderstanding or a 
misapplication of the law resulting in sub-
stantial and prejudicial error, or that evi-
dence clearly preponderated against find-
ings, or that such a serious inequity resulted 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce *=>252, 282 
Claim that trial court should have dis-
counted sum in the notes receivable as it 
did for accounts receivable in determining 
value of assets awarded to wife was un-
P.2d 409 
timely when not brought to attention of 
trial court prior to provision of assets of the 
parties; furthermore, asserted disparity 
was slight and could not be deemed a seri-
ous inequity. 
3. Divorce <s=>252 
That decree of divorce failed to compel 
wife to contribute to monthly mortgage 
payments on commercial property for which 
husband and wife were found to be jointly 
and severally liable did not war ran t as 
sumption that burden would fall upon hus 
band as long as record showed tha t rental: 
on property were ample to discharge mort 
4. Divorce <s=> 240(2) 
Length of marriage and contribution 
of each party to their joint financial succes 
are not inappropriate measures to deter 
mine alimony. 
5. Divorce <s=>252 
There is a distinction between divisici 
of assets accumulated during marriag 
which should be distributed upon an equit; 
ble basis, and postmarital duty of suppo 
and maintenance. 
6. Divorce e=>231 
The most important function of alim 
ny is to provide support for the wife 
nearly as possible at the standard of livii 
she enjoyed during the marriage and 
prevent the wife from becoming a pub 
charge. 
7. Divorce <s=> 240(2) 
Criteria considered in determining 
reasonable award for support and main 
nance include financial conditions and net 
of wife, ability* of wife to produce a su1 
cient income for herself, and ability of h 
band to provide support. 
8. Divorce <s=>240(2) 
Rule that trial court may properly c 
sider a husband's historical earning abi 
when he has experienced a temporary 
crease in income in determining amount 
should contribute for support and mail 
nance of his family is equally applicabl< 
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a where husband experiences un-
rosperity during one year. 
rce <s=>240(2) 
award of $1,000 in alimony and 
child support per month was fair 
litable and should have been direct-
lidering parties' 20-year marriage, 
of each party in monetary success of 
e^, various ventures, and husband's 
s. 
orce «=>308 
:ourt may not, under a divorce de-
tempt to transfer any property of 
parent to the children for the pur-
creating an estate for their perma-
mefit. U.C.A.1953, 15-2-1. 
orce *=>310 
court may not in a divorce decree 
rovision out of the property of either 
parties for the maintenance of the 
i who are of age and who are not 
lly incapacitated. U.C.A.1953, 15-
orce <8=»308 
cree of divorce ordering husband to 
in children as beneficiaries on his life 
ice until each child attained age of 25 
vas subject to be modified so as to 
; that children would remain benefi-
until each attained 21 years of age. 
1953, 15-2-1. 
H. Liapis, Harley W. Gustin, Salt 
City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
G. Haslam, Salt Lake City, for de-
t and appellant. 
JGHAN, Justice: 
itiff based on her complaint and de-
t on his counterclaim were each 
d a decree of divorce. Defendant-
id appeals. We modify the decree by 
ig the award of alimony to $1,000 per 
, and by limiting the insurance cover-
the minor children to their twenty-
irthdays. As so modified the decree 
rmed. 
The parties were married at the age of 
21. At the time of hearing, they were 41. 
Defendant is a successful practicing dentist. 
Plaintiff, a college graduate, has part time 
employment as an educator. Both parties 
are in good health. The trial court divided 
equally the assets accumulated during the 
marriage. Plaintiff was granted custody of 
the two teenage daughters. Plaintiff was 
awarded $2,000 per month alimony and 
$250 per month support for each of the two 
girls. 
[1] The trial court, in a divorce action, 
has considerable latitude of discretion in 
adjusting financial and property interests. 
A party appealing therefrom has the bur-
den to prove there was a misunderstanding 
or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error; or the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the 
findings; or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion.1 
[2] Defendant contends the trial court 
committed certain errors in the process of 
dividing the assets of the parties equally. 
He asserts the court should have discounted 
the sum in the notes receivable as it did for 
the accounts receivable in determining the 
value of the assets awarded to defendant. 
The record does not indicate defendant 
brought this matter to the attention of the 
trial court prior to its determination: the 
claim now is untimely. Furthermore, the 
asserted disparity is slight and cannot be 
deemed a serious inequity. This principle is 
equally applicable to defendant's claim that 
the automobile awarded to plaintiff was of 
a greater value than the automobile, truck 
and boat awarded to defendant. 
[3] Plaintiff and defendant were de-
clared tenants in common of certain com-
mercial property: Plaintiff was awarded 
36.18% interest and defendant was awarded 
63.82%. Plaintiff was awarded the right to 
receive her portion of the rental income. 
The findings of the court recite the parties 
are jointly and severally liable on the mort-
1. Baker v. Baker, Utah, 551 P.2d 1263 (1976). 
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gage on the premises. Defendant contends 
that by explicit provision the decree failed 
to compel plaintiff to contribute to the 
monthly mortgage payments. He assumes 
that such a burden will fall upon him, al-
though there is no such reference in the 
decree. The record shows the rentals to be 
ample to discharge the mortgage. Because 
of the nature of the tenancy and liability of 
the parties, defendant's argument is with-
out merit.2 
Defendant contends the award of $2,000 
alimony, in addition to $500 child support, 
per month to plaintiff was inequitable and 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. The 
finding of the court was based upon the 
parties twenty year marriage; the efforts 
of each in the monetary success of the 
marriage; various ventures; and defend-
ant's earnings. Upon such basis the court 
concluded the sums awarded were fair and 
equitable. 
The record shows that at the time the 
parties separated in October 1975, plaintiff 
sustained the family on $800 per month plus 
her earnings. Defendant contributed fur-
ther amounts for special expenses, such as, 
the insurance premium on the house. 
In April 1976, in response to certain inter-
rogatories, plaintiff itemized her expenses, 
setting forth a sum of $1,265.42 per month. 
At trial, plaintiff presented an exhibit, indi-
cating the monthly expenses for her and 
her two daughters as $1,498. She testified 
that she thought she should have $2,000 
alimony and $500 child support. 
The parties' joint income tax return for 
1975 showed they had an adjusted gross 
income of $97,437. After their itemized 
deductions and personal exemptions, they 
had a taxable income of $88,981. Their 
federal tax was $37,370, and their state tax 
was $4,151. Plaintiff's earnings were 
$3,376. The parties collected $17,650 rent 
on their commercial building; after deduct-
2. Defendant rents a portion of the building for 
his office, for a sum below fair market value. 
In the event there be any deficiency in the 
rental income to discharge expenses and mort-
gage payments, it would be equitable to make 
an adjustment with this in mind. No such 
adjustment is now needed. 
ENGLISH Utah 4 H 
P.2d 409 
ing $6,476 for depreciation and $6,033 for 
expenses, they had a net profit of $5,141. 
They also had a profit of $3,568 from a 
livestock management venture. Their in-
terest income was $523. The professional 
services rendered by defendant accounted 
for the remaining income. The record fur-
ther indicates the income of the parties in 
1975, had more than doubled that of the 
previous year. The following shows the 
taxable income of the parties: 1975, $88,-
981; 1974, $41,702; 1973, $39,630; 1972, 
$30,683; 1971, $27,428. Defendant testified 
that he did not expect this income to re-
main at the unusually high level attained in 
1975. 
[4, 5] The standard utilized by the trial 
court, viz., the length of the marriage and 
the contributions of each to their joint fi-
nancial success, is not an appropriate meas-
ure to determine alimony. There is a dis-
tinction between the division of assets accu-
mulated during marriage, which should be 
distributed upon an equitable basis, and the 
post-marital duty of support and mainte-
nance. 
The purpose of alimony is to provide 
support for the wife and not to inflict 
punitive damages on the husband. Ali-
mony is not intended as a penalty against 
the husband nor a reward to the wife. 
3 
[6, 7] In Nace v. Nace* the court stated 
that the most important function of alimo-
ny is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living 
she enjoyed during marriage, and to pre-
vent the wife from becoming a public-
charge. The court observed that criteria 
considered in determining a reasonable 
award for support and maintenance include 
the financial conditions and needs of the 
wife, the ability of the wife to produce a 
3. 2 Nelson Divorce and Annulment (2d Ed 
1961 Kev. Vol.) § 14.06 pp. 11-12. 
4. 107 Ariz. 411, 489 P.2d 48. 50 (1971). 
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ent income for herself; and the abili-
the husband to provide support.5 
Hendricks v. Hendricks6 this court 
The amount of alimony is 
sured by the wife's needs and re-
ements, considering her station in 
and upon the husband's ability to 
be matter under consideration, plain-
stified she was paid $45 per day by 
lion Corporation, for her work as a 
economist. She worked, by choice, 
imately 60 days per year. The rec-
es not indicate the court considered 
plaintiff's actual or potential earning 
, in determining her alimony. There 
ndication the potential rental income 
the commercial property was con-
l in determining the alimony.7 In her 
)ny plaintiff could only substantiate 
for support in the amount of $1,500 
•nth for the entire family. She mere-
s t she should receive the greater 
ts. 
The court below in determining de-
t's ability to pay considered only his 
ix return. It overlooked the fact the 
included plaintiff's income, and 
which in the future will be appor-
to plaintiff. It did not consider de-
t's historical earning ability: His in-
:or the previous year was fifty per-
:ss. In the recent decisions of Cum-
v. Cummings, 562 P.2d 229, 1977, and 
iskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256, 
his court ruled the trial court may 
ly consider a husband's historical 
£ ability, when he has experienced a 
•ary decrease in income, when deter-
) see: Stein v. Stein, 159 Mont. 496, 499 
794 (1972); Thompson v. Thompson, 82 
.2d 352, 510 P.2d 827 (1973); Bumside v. 
iide, 85 N.M. 517, 514 P.2d 36 (1973); 
m v. Carlton, 217 Kan. 681, 538 P.2d 727 
)• 
Utah 553, 559, 63 P.2d 277, 279 (1936). 
he time of the hearing, some of the rent-
ere being diverted into three short term 
for the three children of the parties; the 
terminate in December 1977. 
mining the amount he should contribute for 
the support and maintenance of his family. 
This principle should be equally applicable, 
when the husband experiences unusual 
prosperity during one year. 
[9] After a careful evaluation of the 
record, a fair and equitable amount would 
be $1,000 per month alimony, and $250 per 
month for each child, for support.8 
Defendant further contends that the trial 
court exceeded its statutory authority by 
ordering defendant to maintain the children 
as beneficiaries on his life insurance until 
each child shall attain the age of twenty-
five years. Section 15-2-1, U.C.A.1953, as 
amended 1975, provides, in divorce actions, 
a court may order support to age 21. 
[10,11] Since the record does not reveal 
that any of the children has an incapacity 
or disability, defendant's duty to support 
them terminates at the age of 21. A court 
may not, under a decree of divorce, attempt 
to transfer any property of either parent to 
the children, for the purpose of creating an 
estate for their permanent benefit. Fur-
thermore, the court may not make provision 
out of the property of either of the parties 
for the maintenance of children who are of 
age, and who are not physically incapacita-
ted.8 
[12] Defendant is entitled to have the 
decree modified to provide that the children 
shall remain beneficiaries until each shall 
attain the age of 21. 
Defendant's other points are without 
merit. 
The decree of the trial court is affirmed 
with the modifications in alimony to $1,000 
per month and the aforementioned change 
in the insurance provision. 
No costs awarded. 
8. The decree requires that defendant maintain 
their son who is a missionary for the parties 
church. Defendant is further obligated to pro-
vide medical and hospital insurance for the 
children; and to maintain his life insurance. 
9. See Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301, 307, 431 
P.2d 133 (1967), footnote 2; 59 A.L.R.3d 9, 
Anno.: Divorce: Provision in decree that one 
party obtain or maintain life insurance for ben-
efit of other party or child, § 7(a), pp. 29-33. 
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C. J., WILKINS and CROCK- edy sought in light of facts of case in which 
demanded as matter of right. 
ELLETT 
ETT, JJ., and JOHN F. WAHLQUIST, Dis-
trict Judge, concur. 
HALL, J., does not participate herein. 
KttNUMBERSYSUM ( > 
STATE BANK OF LEHI, a Utah Corpo-
ration, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Ralph O. WOOLSEY and Sylvia W. Wool-
sey, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 14719. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 7, 1977. 
Action was brought to foreclose securi-
ty interest in real and personal property in 
keeping with acceleration clause in notes 
which were allegedly delinquent. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, J. Rob-
ert Bullock, J., allowed foreclosure and de-
fendants appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Maughan, J., held that: (1) defendants 
were not entitled to jury trial; (2) even if 
plaintiff had represented it would carry 
note until defendants could effect refinanc-
ing of their obligation, in absence of de-
fendants making any promise in return for 
the promise of forbearance, there was no 
consideration to support plaintiff's promise; 
(3) evidence supported finding that plaintiff 
had properly accelerated payments due un-
der the notes, and (4) evidence pertaining to 
alteration of integrated agreement was 
properly stricken. 
Affirmed. 
1. Jury e=>13(l) 
Trial court in determining whether le-
gal or equitable issues predominant should 
examine nature of rights asserted and rein-
jury is 
2. Mortgages to 137 
Mortgage conveys no legal estate to 
mortgagee, but gives mortgagee lien on 
premises to secure payment of indebted-
ness. 
3. Mortgages <s=»137 
Mortgage is not conveyance of tit le; 
the mortgagor has legal title. 
4. Mortgages <s=>137, 145 
Interest of mortgagee is not estate, but 
merely lien, an appendage of debt, incapa-
ble of being separated from debt and t rans-
ferred by itself and mortgagee has no legal 
remedy on mortgage, no power to recover 
possession of land, and can enforce lien 
against land in no legal action. 
5. Mortgages <s=>380 
Relief granted to mortgagee in equity 
is enforcement of his equitable lien by sale 
of premises and application of proceeds 
upon the debt. 
6. Mortgages <s=>534 
When mortgagee is granted enforce-
ment of lien by sale of premises, mortga-
gor's estate is in effect transferred to pur-
chaser at judicial sale and legal estate is 
taken from mortgagor and transferred to 
purchaser. 
7. Mortgages c=>534 
Mortgagee may buy land at judicial 
sale and acquire title, but he acquires it as 
purchaser and not as mortgagee. 
8. Mortgages <£=>137, 188, 199(1) 
Mortgagor retains full legal estate, 
subject only to encumbrance of mortgagee's 
lien, and is erftitled to possession, use, rents 
and profits up to time when his title is fully 
divested by judicial sale in proceeding to 
enforce the lien. 
9. Mortgages «=>188 
Mortgagor is able to secure his estate 
and possession by legal action and has no 
need or occasion to invoke aid of equity, but 
he is not denied access to appropriate equi-
table defenses when mortgagee seeks en-
forcement of its lien. 
